Household indebtedness and financial stability: Reasons to be afraid? by Dániel Holló
INTRODUCTION
One of the main tasks of financial stability analysis is
monitoring the shock absorbing capacity of the financial
system. In this context, the question we wish to investigate is
the manner in which low probability but nevertheless
plausible extreme macroeconomic events would impact the
banking system, and to what extent the capital position of the
sector would be affected.
1
Analysis of the shock absorbing capacity of the financial
system is important both from the viewpoint of the financial
sector and other economic agents as well. Financial
institutions can gain insight into what type and how strong an
adverse macroeconomic event would significantly influence
their profitability and capital position. For other economic
agents, the importance of this information is based on the
fact that the stability of real economic developments depends
strongly on the stability of the financial system. Namely, as a
result of various real economic shocks, banks’ losses may
increase considerably, and banks may react by curtailing
credit supply, which could deepen an ongoing recession even
more, due to a further decline in consumption and
investment expenditures. Accordingly, there is a strong
relationship between financial and macroeconomic stability
as a stable financial system cannot exist without the stability
of macroeconomic developments and vice versa.
Developments in household credit risk are one of the key
elements of financial stability. A deeper analysis of credit
risks was particularly justified by the banking sector’s ever
increasing exposure to households, and the effect on
households’ solvency resulting from the fiscal package
announced in the summer of 2006.
As a result of significant credit growth dynamics, between
1999 and 2006 the total debt outstanding in nominal terms
rose more than tenfold, and a shift towards foreign currency
loans can be observed in the composition of debt by
denomination, which has made Hungarian households’
balance sheet position more sensitive to exchange rate
fluctuations as they do not have a natural hedge. In terms of
product structure, a continuous increase in mortgage type
products has been seen, which can provide considerable
security for banks in case of default, thus reducing risks
significantly.
Nonetheless, current economic developments call into
question the sustainability of households’ solvency. Despite
the negative effects of the fiscal consolidation package
announced in the summer of 2006, a dynamic increase of
debt outstanding is still being observed. However, due to the
decline in real income and the resulting deterioration in
resistance to other shocks (e.g. exchange rate depreciation,
increase in interest rates), the sustainability of solvency may
be questionable, even in the medium term. Deteriorating
solvency may lead to a large number of households
defaulting, to which banks may react by curtailing credit
supply (tightening credit standards), which may also result in
a slump in retail lending market growth, and economic
growth may continue to decelerate.
The remainder of the article is organized as follows. In the
second chapter we briefly present those two methods – the
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The dynamic increase in household indebtedness seen in Hungary in recent years has raised a number of questions relating to
the risks of this growth and the long-term sustainability of banking portfolio quality. The continuous monitoring of risks is a
task of the MNB, which stems from its supervisory role over financial stability. In order to explore the extent and structure of
household indebtedness, the central bank conducted a questionnaire-based survey among indebted households in January 2007.
In this article, we present the structural distribution and riskiness of indebted households as well as the effect of various
unfavourable macroeconomic developments on banks’ portfolio quality and capital adequacy, based on the findings of the
survey. Our findings suggest that the shock absorbing capacity of the banking sector is sufficient (i.e. the capital adequacy ratio
of the banking system would not fall below the current regulatory minimum of 8 per cent) even if the most extreme stress
scenarios were to occur.
1There is no generally accepted definition of financial stability, but there is a wide consensus that bank crises pose the greatest threat to the stability of the financial
system, as banking activities cover almost all areas of the financial system. In this article we focus on the stability of the banking system, while the stability of the
banking system and the stability of the financial system are treated as synonymous terms, despite the imperfect congruence.macro and micro approaches – which constitute the framework
for the analysis of household credit risk. The third chapter
analyzes risk concentration in various dimensions using the data
from the questionnaire-based survey
2 conducted by the MNB
amongst indebted households in January 2007. In chapter four,
using the survey data we present the main findings of
household stress tests and the ramifications for financial
stability. Finally, chapter five presents the conclusions.
POSSIBLE METHODS OF ANALYSING
HOUSEHOLD INDEBTEDNESS
Several indicators are used for the quantification of
household indebtedness and the resulting risks. Some of these
analyze the sustainable size of loans outstanding (the ratio of
loans outstanding to annual disposable income), while other
indicators evaluate the magnitude of credit risks on the basis
of instalments paid by households (estimation of the
repayment burden, i.e. the amount spent by households on
loan repayment in a year as a proportion of annual disposable
income). A comparison of total debt and financial assets gives
a picture of households’ financial position, i.e. it indicates to
what extent savings cover the amounts borrowed. The
reflection of risks in banking portfolio quality can be
measured by the ratio of non-performing loans within total
loans and developments in loan loss provisions.
Based on the above indicators, depending on the aggregation
level of the available data, the analysis of households’
indebtedness and the resulting risks can be carried out within
a macro or micro framework.
According to the macro approach, the developments in risks
and the related banking system portfolio quality are analysed
using macro variables and variables generated from the
aggregate household sector data, which may affect
households’ income position and/or repayment burden at the
sectoral level. By contrast, the micro approach concentrates
on indebted households, uses individual data and takes
account of the structure of indebtedness, thus allowing a
more precise measurement of risks and developments in
portfolio quality.
Despite the relatively rapid increase in the debt to disposable
income ratio, the indebtedness of Hungarian households is
still far below the level of developed economies, i.e. in
parallel with the real convergence there is further room for
the ‘catching-up process’. However, due to the unfavourable
term structure of loans (loans with shorter maturity), the
value of the repayment burden is close to the Western
European level; accordingly, in international comparison,
despite their relatively low level of indebtedness, Hungarian
households spend nearly the same proportion of their income
on loan repayment (Chart 1). Total debt as a proportion of
financial assets increased from 6 per cent in 1999 to 26 per
cent by the end of 2006, also reflecting growing risks. The
lower growth rate of financial savings compared to the
increase in total debt represents a risk, because less financial
reserves are accumulated which could mitigate the impacts of
shocks in the event that macroeconomic developments
become unfavourable.
If we calculate the aforementioned indicators on the basis of
the questionnaire-based survey only for the indebted
households (micro approach), a much more refined picture
emerges. Among indebted households, the ratio of debt to
annual disposable income is 94 per cent on average,
borrowers spend on average 18 per cent of their income on
repayment, while the amount of loans outstanding is 7.5
times higher than that of financial savings. As only 18 per
cent of debtors have savings, it can be established that savers
and borrowers are typically different, i.e. the household
sector shows a significant heterogeneity.
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2 Commissioned by the MNB, a questionnaire-based survey examining the characteristics of indebted households was conducted in January 2007. 1046 household with
some sort of credit were surveyed. The survey provided detailed information on the indebted households’financial and income positions as well as other personal
characteristics. See detailed information on the questionnaire-based survey on pages 35-36 of the publication titled Report on Financial Stability, April 2007,
http://english.mnb.hu/Engine.aspx?page=mnben_stabil&ContentID=9555.
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Sources: OECD, MNB.Overall, although the indicators generated from aggregated,
i.e. sectoral-level data, indicate the direction of the
developments in risks quite well, they may be misleading in
terms of the magnitude, as they considerably underestimate it
due to disregarding the structure of indebtedness. In the
financial sector, the potential loss resulting from credit risks
depends on the extent to which total debt is concentrated at
households with stretched financial and income positions.
Considering all this, we decided to analyse micro level data
more thoroughly, and in the following chapters, the
magnitude of credit risks is quantified based on these data.
MAGNITUDE OF CREDIT RISKS IN TERMS
OF VARIOUS DIMENSIONS
Indebted households’ resistance to shocks is determined by
the size of their income reserve, financial savings and real
assets. In the calculations, we disregard the roles of both
financial savings and real assets.
3
Household income reserve (or shock absorbing capacity) is
the amount which remains from the monthly net disposable
income after the deduction of consumption expenditure and
loan repayments. If the indicator is negative, the given
household is considered risky, as due to the extent of its
stretchedness it would not be able to withstand the effects of
various shocks for a longer time without loan repayment
problems.
4 In this case, households are either eating up their
financial savings, or have to reduce their consumption in
order to be able to keep up repaying the loan. At present,
approximately 2.2-4.2 per cent of indebted households can
be considered risky, but 5.7-12.9 per cent of the total debt
belongs to them.
5 These are the loans outstanding (‘debt at
risk’) which may be the source of potential losses from the
perspective of the financial sector, if we suppose that risky
households become insolvent and in case of households with
positive income reserves the probability of default is zero.
The distribution of risky households and risky debt can be
examined in terms of various dimensions. We considered
income as the basic dimension, and beyond that we also
analysed developments in risks according to two other
features: domicile (region) of the household and the age of
the head of the household. However, it should be noted that
the household’s disposable income is not independent of the
latter two factors, as on the one hand, the size of the income
is determined by the region where the household is located,
and on the other hand, in the initial period of one’s career
individual incomes are typically lower. Therefore, income is
more or less a condensate of information stemming from the
given household’s sociodemographic features.
Classifying indebted households in income quintiles
according to their per capita disposable income shows that, in
parallel with the increase in income, the probability of default
steadily decreases (Chart 2). The results suggest that in those
indebted households where per capita income is less than
HUF 37,000, the average odds of having payment difficulties
is 8 per cent. In those households, in turn, where the per
capita monthly disposable income exceeds HUF 81,000, the
average default probability is 1.4 per cent.
As there are considerable differences in households’ incomes
across regions, households’ resistance to shocks (the size of
income reserve accumulated monthly, labour market
prospects), and hence their ability to repay loans, is strongly
influenced by the region where they live. In terms of the
magnitude of risks, there are significant differences across
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3These two seemingly strong assumptions probably do not distort the results considerably, partly because in the sample both the ratio of those who have financial
savings (18 per cent) and the average financial savings volume are low, i.e. in the event of permanent unfavourable economic developments it can be assumed that
financial reserves run out fast, while real assets are less liquid, i.e. their prompt use in case of payment problems is limited.
4The aforementioned risk definition is restrictive in the sense that, on the one hand, households with positive income reserves may also have payment problems, and
on the other hand, the size of income reserve at which payment problems may come up may be different for each household.
5 Because of income uncertainties (black incomes and mistakes made in reporting income information) we prepared the calculations with 10 per cent higher disposable
income as well, which resulted in the two (presumably extreme) values of the ratio of risky households and risky loans outstanding. 
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Share of risky households and debt at risk according





















































































Share of risky households
Debt at risk
Source: Author’s calculations.areas of different levels of development. In the Northern
Great Plain and Northern Hungarian regions, which can be
considered less developed, the share of risky households and
risky loans outstanding is higher, while the situation is much
more favourable in Central Hungary which also includes
Budapest and Western Trans-Danubia (Chart 3).
6
Categorising the indebted on the basis of the age of the head
of the household shows that in the case of households with a
head between 30-60 years of age the average default
probability is nearly the same, around 4.5 per cent, and the
situation is more favourable only in case of the heads who are
younger or older than that. Despite the low level of
differences across average default probabilities according to
age, the volatility of debt at risk within individual categories
is considerable (Chart 4). It is important to emphasise that in
the case of households with a head below the age of 30, in the
given category more than 18 per cent of the loans
outstanding can be considered as risky. The underlying
reason may be that those young households who are not
liquidity constrained, relying on the higher expected income
in the latter stage of their life cycle, can increase their current
consumption level by borrowing, and their investment
(housing) is also mainly financed from credit. However, as
their income in this part of their lives is relatively low, this
temporarily results in a high repayment burden, which
gradually becomes lower as they grow older and their income
steadily becomes higher. Accordingly, despite the fact that
within the group of households with heads of various ages
average default probabilities do not show significant
differences, in the case of repayment problems of young
households, banks’ losses may be higher compared to the
other age groups as a consequence of the much higher
average size of the loan per household.
IMPACT OF VARIOUS SHOCK 
SCENARIOS ON THE STABILITY OF 
THE BANKING SYSTEM
7
The analysis of indebted households’ shock absorbing
capacity requires identification of those major risk factors
which significantly influence solvency. We have identified
two macroeconomic factors of this nature. One is a risk
premium shock triggered by unfavourable external and
internal macroeconomic developments, which may result in
an increase in the forint yield and/or in depreciation of the
exchange rate of the forint. This affects households’ solvency
through an increase in instalments. The other factor, the
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Share of risky households
Debt at risk
Source: author’s calculations.
6 Central Hungary: Pest, Budapest; Central Trans-Danubia: Fejér, Komárom-Esztergom, Veszprém; Western Trans-Danubia: Gyõr-Moson-Sopron, Vas, Zala; Southern
Trans-Danubia: Baranya, Somogy, Tolna; Northern Hungary: Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén, Heves, Nógrád; Northern Great Plain: Hajdú-Bihar, Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok,
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg; Southern Great Plain: Bács-Kiskun, Békés, Csongrád.
7 In this article, the developments in default probabilities and risked exposures with respect to various shocks are analysed using a simple method (income reserve
calculation). Despite the simplicity of the method, its conclusions proved to be stable even in comparison with the results gained from more sophisticated models.
For more details on the calculations and simulations as well as the other alternative approaches see: Dániel Holló and Mónika Papp (2007): Assessing Household Credit
Risk: Evidence from a Household Survey (manuscript).impact of which was examined, is a decline in employment
affecting indebted households. For those concerned it affects
the magnitude of credit risk through a decline in disposable
income.
In the course of the stress tests, we determined the default
probabilities belonging to the various shocks, then, assuming
a given loss rate (LGD), we drew quantified conclusions with
regard to the stability of the banking system. We examined
the effects of individual risk scenarios on banks’ capital
adequacy ratio separately, and we also analysed this when the
risk scenarios took place simultaneously. In the calculations,
we quantified the effects developing through the credit risk
channel. Our simulations are static, i.e. in case of the risk
scenarios we assumed that neither the volume, nor the
structure of households’ consumption change, households’
labour supply remained unchanged, and there was no
banking adjustment, i.e. banks did not react to the increasing
losses by curtailing credit supply and/or restructuring their
portfolios. We also assumed that individual banks’ customers
are not different from a risk perspective, i.e. in terms of
quality, all banks’ household portfolios are identical to the
representative household portfolio used in the course of the
calculations.
Based on this latter assumption, as no information on
household default probabilities from individual banks is
available, when calculating the losses, we use the same default
probability for each bank (the share of households with
negative income reserves within the sample). The difference
between banks is constituted by the composition of their
portfolio and the product specific loss rates (LGD), which,
however, adequately reflects the differences in quality across
individual banking portfolios. This means that if the average
default probability of two banks’ respective household
portfolios are identical, but one’s portfolio is dominated by
mortgage loans then the developments in losses of this bank
may be more favourable compared to another bank, in whose
portfolio mortgage loans represent a relatively lower share.
DEVELOPMENTS IN DEBT AT RISK ON
THE BASIS OF TWO RISK SCENARIOS
The effect of the risk premium shock
Several scenarios were analyzed: 100, 300 and 500 basis
point increases in forint yields as well as 10, 20 and 30 per
cent depreciation of the forint exchange rate.
8 The increase in
forint yields and the depreciation of the exchange rate of the
forint lead to an increase in credit risk through an increase in
loan instalments. However, the former and the latter directly
influence only the magnitude of the burdens of forint and
foreign currency loans, respectively.
With regard to households’ loans outstanding by
denomination, the ratio of forint and foreign currency
denominated credit within the total retail portfolio was
around 50 per cent each at end-2006, but now 80-90 per cent
of new loans are denominated in foreign currency. As the
ratio of forint loans repricing within a year is relatively low,
an increase in yield affects only approximately half of the
forint loans outstanding. Exchange rate depreciation, in turn,
appears in the monthly instalments of foreign currency loans
immediately and directly. Consequently, portfolio quality
reacts to exchange rate depreciation in a more sensitive
manner than to an increase in forint yields. Accordingly, as a
result of the steady growth of the share of foreign currency
loans, the exposure of the loan portfolio to exchange rate risk
is increasing continuously. However, in connection with the
effects of the exchange rate risk it is important to mention
that it represents a real risk, if the exchange rate depreciation
is significant and long-lasting. The underlying explanation is
that households can more or less withstand the effects of a
temporary significant exchange rate depreciation by reducing
consumption expenditure, which may denote a restructuring
of consumption (substitution effect, shift towards consuming
cheaper products) or a reduction of the volume of
consumption and the use of financial reserves, while
maintaining an unchanged structure of consumption.
In preparing the calculations, we assumed the permanent
presence of the shock, since this ensures that the risky loans
outstanding calculated in the cases of the individual shocks
surely become non-performing. Based on the data, it can be
established that at least one year is needed in the sample for
all households considered risky to become insolvent (to use
up all their financial reserves).
9
If there is no shock, approximately 2.2-4.2 per cent of
households can be considered as threatened; they account for
5.7-12.9 per cent of the portfolio. In the most extreme
scenario (500 basis points forint interest rate increase, 30 per
cent exchange rate depreciation), the share of risky
households nearly doubles, while debt at risk increase by
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8 During stress tests, the effect of shifts of 3-8 standard deviation in a given risk factor is often analysed (the tails of the distribution), as they can be considered
adequately extreme developments. The values of the examined risk premium shocks are the tails of the historic distributions calculated from the data of the HUF/EUR
exchange rate and the 3-month forint yields between January 2001 and May 2007 (in case of the exchange rate 3, 6 and 8 standard deviation, in case of the interest
rate 1, 2, 3 standard deviation).
9 Depending on the magnitude of shocks, households’average resistance is between 1 and 3 months, i.e. this is the average period of time in which they eat up their
financial reserves, provided that there is no change in their behaviour (consumption habits, restructuring of expenditures, and increase in labour supply). approximately 6-10 percentage points compared to the
shock-free case.
Impact of a decline in employment
If one of the family members in an indebted household
becomes unemployed, the decline in the household’s
disposable income affects developments in solvency.
In the simulation, we calculated a 3 per cent
10 decline in
employment, using several simplifying assumptions. On the
one hand, in the case of each randomly selected household we
assumed the job loss of 1 employee, and supposed that within
the one-year period under review the person would not find a
new job. In the simulations we did not take into account the
personal factors behind becoming unemployed, i.e. that there
may be differences between the probabilities of becoming
unemployed depending on the various characters of
individuals. On this basis, we determined the proportion of
cases when the decline in income and substituting it with
unemployment benefit leads to income reserves’ becoming
negative, and how much it adds to the risky loans outstanding.
We examined the effect of the decline in employment on the
proportion of risked portfolio along two scenarios. First we
assumed that the probability of becoming unemployed is
identical in each sector, independently of macroeconomic
developments, and thus we analysed the effect of the
simultaneous occurrence of the most extreme risk premium
shock (500 basis point interest rate increase and a 30 per cent
depreciation of the exchange rate) and the 3 per cent decline
in employment on the increase of the share of risky debts.
Then, in the second case we assumed that lay-offs affect a
given sector (services, agriculture, industry, trade); in this
case we did not take into account the simultaneous
occurrence of the risk premium shocks, interrelationships
between sectors and pass-through effects. The relevance of
this latter scenario is provided on the one hand by the fact
that, the exposure of individual sectors to cyclical
fluctuations of the economy may differ significantly, and as a
result the developments of employment also show sectoral
fluctuations and may be more dominant in certain sectors.
On the other hand, there may be differences between sectors
in terms of the composition of loan portfolio extended to
those working in the given sector, which may also affect the
developments in losses considerably.
According to the first scenario, as a result of the simultaneous
occurrence of the decline in employment and the risk
premium shock, the expected increase in debt at risk is
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Forint yield Based on original income Based on income increased by 10 percent
increase  
Depreciation of forint exchange rate (basis point)
baseline 10 percent 20 percent 30 percent baseline 10 percent 20 percent 30 percent
Baseline 12.9 15.5 18.1 21.5 5.7 7.8 9.0 10.6
100 bp 13.2 15.5 18.1 21.5 5.7 7.8 9.0 10.6
300 bp 14.3 16.5 19.2 22.6 5.7 7.8 9.0 10.6
500 bp 14.9 17.2 19.8 23.2 6.6 8.8 10.0 11.6
Table 1
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Source: author’s calculations.
10 Between 1998 and 2006 the average employment rate was 56 per cent, with a 1.12 per cent standard deviation. Accordingly, a 3 per cent decline in employment
corresponds to shift of approximately 3 standard deviation.between 8.6 and 12 percentage points, which denotes that
the expected risky loans outstanding would range between
14.3 and 24.9 per cent (Chart 5).
Assuming that the decline in employment is sector-specific,
compared to the case when there is no shock, the effect of a
3 per cent lay-off on debt at risk would probably be the
greatest if the lay-offs affected the services sector. This is
followed by the industry, then trade and finally by agriculture
(Chart 6).
ASSESSING THE EFFECTS OF SHOCKS
FROM A FINANCIAL STABILITY ASPECT
The effects of various shock scenarios can be assessed in light
of how debt at risk and the share of risky households increase
compared to a scenario with no shocks. Assuming that in the
case of debt at risk calculated in line with the individual
scenarios non-performance takes place in any case, with
given loss rates (LGD), the magnitude of losses can be
determined.
11
Loss rate is that part of the value of non-performing loans
which is not recovered during the collection process and
enforcement of collateral. Assuming the non-performance
of a HUF 10 million loan, the 10 per cent loss rate means
that the lender suffers a HUF 1 million loss. Determining
the loss rate is not simple because, on the one hand, no data
for Hungary is available and, on the other hand, its value
also varies by products. In case of mortgage loans, as a
result of selling the collateral, the probability of recovery is
much higher than in the case of uncollateralized loans.
Accordingly, for each product we calculated using different
loss rates (LGD), which can be considered conservative in
international comparison. For mortgages, car purchase
loans and other (uncollateralised) loans we assumed 10, 30
and 90 per cent loss rates (LGD), respectively. It is
important to emphasise that when determining loss rates it
is justified to take account of the differences between
products, as applying a uniform loss rate may significantly
distort (improve or deteriorate) the results in case of some
‘specialised’ banks.
Based on the stress test results we analyzed how losses affect
banks’ capital position. We used end-2006 data in the
calculations, in which we also took into account the
profit/loss of the previous year and the size of the already
formed loss provisions. The profitability and the capital
strength of the banks are influenced by the stress event only
in those cases when the losses exceeded the size of the loss
provisions. We examined the extent of capital adequacy not
only at the banking sector level, but also with regard to
individual banks. Where a bank belongs to a banking group –
assuming group-level capital allocation – we evaluated group
members’ results together. We considered it risky, if a bank’s
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11The loss is the product of the default probability, the risked exposure and the loss rate (LGD). The proportion of the risky debt in the event of the most extreme risk
premium shock, in case of the original and 10 per cent higher income is 23.2 and 11.6 per cent, respectively. If the most extreme risk premium shock and the 3 per
cent decline in employment take place simultaneously, the risked debt in case of the original income and 10 per cent higher income is 26.5 and 16.18 per cent,
respectively. These latter two values are the sums of the shock-free risked debt and the extreme values of the risked debt distributions (99th percentile values of the
distributions in Chart 5). Accordingly, the unexpected losses: 26.5=12.9+13.6 and 16.18=5.7+10.48. In our calculations, we use the extreme values of the distribution.
The underlying reason is that while banks covered expected loss by pricing and provisioning, unexpected losses have to be covered from the capital.
Chart 6
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Source: author’s calculations.capital adequacy ratio declined below the current regulatory
minimum of 8 per cent.
Our findings suggest that the capital position of both individual
banks and the banking sector as a whole can be considered
stable even if the most extreme scenarios take place. The main
underlying reason is that banks’ portfolios are dominated by
mortgage loans, in respect of which, as a consequence of the
internationally conservative loan to value ratio, losses can be
reduced considerably by selling the collateral.
CONCLUSIONS
As a result of the steadily increasing household indebtedness,
the analysis of the developments in households’ exposure and
the effect of potential shocks on the quality of the household
loan portfolio is of special importance in the examination of
the banking sector’s resilience to shocks. When quantifying
the extent of risks and the effects of banks’ losses, one must
strive to take into account the structure of indebtedness, for
which detailed data on indebted households’ financial and
income positions are required.
According to the findings of the study, the magnitude of risks
varies according to regions, the age of the head of the
household and the household’s disposable income. It can also
be mentioned that risk concentration among the indebted is
of an unfavourable direction, as a significant amount of loans
is held by households with stretched financial and income
positions (the ratio of risky loans to total loans exceeds the
share of risky households within the sample). However, the
risks are somewhat mitigated by the fact that banking
portfolios are dominated by mortgage loans, which are able
to provide considerable security for banks in the case of
default.
Based on the shock scenarios, the default probability of the
household portfolio would increase particularly significantly
as a result of an extreme and permanent risk premium shock.
However, the banking system shows resilience both on the
individual and on the aggregate level, i.e. in any of the
scenarios the capital adequacy ratio would not fall below the
current regulatory minimum of 8 per cent.
Finally, it is important to note that the resultant of two
effects must not be disregarded when evaluating the results.
One of them stems from the static behavioural assumptions
applied in the calculations (consumption expenditure, labour
supply and banks’ unchanged behaviour over the medium
term); its dissolution may have a favourable effect on the
magnitude of risks as a consequence of the agents’
adjustment. The other one is that in the calculations we
disregard the effects of shocks passing through to other
segments of the economy and the effects of shocks on asset
prices, which may generate additional losses through the
deterioration of other banking portfolios and through the
decline in the value of collaterals.
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